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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
WHO IS AN AL=N ENmY?-One Gustav Mfiller, a native German, resided
in England on May 2oth, i915. He had never been naturalized. He owned a
leasehold house in England, and on the date just mentioned he executed a
power of attorney to one John White to sell this leasehold house and make
proper conveyance of the same. Six days later he was permitted by the Brit-
ish Government to return to Germany, and he started the same day, May
26th. He was known to be in Germany on June iith, but the date of his
arrival was unknown. On June 2 the leasehold was sold to Tingley, but the
latter, upon learning the facts here given respecting Mfiller refused to proceed
with the contract of sale, and commenced an action for a declaration that
the contract was illegal because at the time it was made the defendant,
Mfiller, was an alien enemy. Evg, J., held that this fact had not been proved,
and dismissed the action, and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeal,
Tingley v. Mfier, [1917] L. R. 2 Ch. 144, and the decision of Evr, J., was
sustained. '
The case raises the broad question of who is an alien enemy, and six
judges of the Court of Appeal wrote extensive opinions upon it. All the
judges agreed that Muiller's German nationality and allegiance did not make
him an alien enemy. Five of them agreed that his departure from England
for the purpose of returning to Germany did not make him an alien enemy,
and that he should actually have reached Germany before the character of
alien enemy attached to him. They differed as to the proof necessary to show
his return. Ev, J., had held that evidence of his departure for Germany on
May 26th did not prove his arrival in Germany by June 2, and two judges of
the Court of Appeal, agreed. But the other three judges who thought such
arrival was necessary to be shown, were of opinion that there was a pre-
sumption of fact that he arrived within seven days after leaving England.
ScauwoN, L. J., thought that Mfiller became an alien enemy the moment
he departed for Germany, on the ground that he thereupon lost his com-
mercial or trade domicil in England and until he acquired another his
national character reverted and this made him an alien enemy.
The term "alien enemy" is used with different meanings, depending on the
principles or rules sought to be applied to the class so designated. Thus
by United States Revised Statutes, Sec. 4o67, relating to war, it is enacted
that "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upward, shall be
liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies."
This meaning is used in the Presidential Proclamations of April 6 and
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November 16, 1917, regarding the conduct of alien enemies, within the
United States. And it is the meaning employed in such cases as Dorsey v.
Brigham, (i898) 177 Ill. 25o, construing statues relating to naturalization.
But in connection with the regulations of trade with the enemy an en-
tirely different meaning is given to the term. It was this meaning which was
involved in Tingley v. MiWer. The British Trading With the Enemy Act,
1914, (4-5 Geo. 5, ch. 87), does not define the term, but the Trading with the
Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, of September 9, igx4, defined an "enemy" as
any person of whatever nationality resident or carrying on business in the
enemy country (Tingley v. Miller, p. 179, per SCRUToT, L. J.). This is
substantially the same definition as that given by our own Trading With the
Enemy Act, of Oct. 6, 1917, which defines an enemy as a person residing in
enemy territory or resident outside of the United States and doing business
within enemy territory.
The term as employed in these acts has clearly taken on a meaning rele-
vant to the purpose with which the acts were passed, namely, trade or com-
merce. Nationality has nothing to do with the matter, and domicil is not
controlling. A German citizen residing in the United States, though domi-
ciled in Germany, is not an alien enemy, while a neutral domiciled in a
neutral country may be ail alien enemy, if he is engaged in business within
enemy territory. Even a citizen of the United States would be an alien
enemy if voluntarily resident in a hostile country. Dicay ON Pmakrvs, p. 3.
It is when one becomes a part of the business organization of the enemy,
directly contributing by his trade or business to the welfare of the enemy,
that he becomes an alien enemy under these Acts. The common law, which
forbad trading with the enemy, as well as statutes regulating the matter, are
"governed upon the public policy, which forbids the doing of acts that will
be or may be to the advantage of the enemy State by increasing its capacity
for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods, or other
resources available to individuals in the enemy State. Trading with a Brit-
ish subject or the subject of a neutral state carrying on business in the hostile
territory is as much assistance to the alien enemy as if it were with a sub-
ject of enemy nationality carrying on business in the enemy State, and, there-
fore, for the purpose of the enforcement of civil rights, they are equally
treated as alien enemies." Per Lord RZAmDnG, in Porter v. Freudenberg [1915]
i T_ B. 866.
This is analogous to the view taken by the prize courts as to "enemy
property." Thus in The Benito Estenger (1899), 176 U. S. 568, 571, the
Supreme Court said that "property engaged in any illegal intercourse with
the -enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an ally or a
citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character.'
In the Mi~ler Case there was nothing to show that the defendant had
begun to carry on trade in Germany from any point outside of Germany,
so that the establishment of commercial relations between him and the
enemy could arise only through his re-establishment of residence in Ger-
many. Hence not until he actually reached Germany could he be of any
advantaie to the enemy in the way of trade, and the views of the ma-
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jority of the judges was in harmony with this commercial test of enemy
character.
In Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. [Ig6], 2 A. C. 307,
the House of Lords was asked to go a step farther along the same line, and
hold an English corporation to be an alien enemy because substantially all
its shares were held by German subjects and its directors were all German
subjects, three-fourths of them resident in Germany when war was de-
clared. The Court of Appeal had held that it was not an alien enemy. In
the House of Lords, Lord H.aaBUY contended that it was an enemy, the
corporation being substantially a mere partnership with a limited liability, all
the partners presumably residing in enemy territory. He thought that "the
unlawfulness of trading with the enemy could not be excused by the ingenuity
of the means adopted." Lord ATKINSON thought an English Company might
well be an alien enemy if in fact it could be shown that its real business ac-
tivity was in enemy territory, but that the record was silent on that point.
Lord SHAW dissented from both these positions, saying that since no div-
idends or assets could be paid to enemy shareholders, "and all trading with
these shareholders * * being interpelled, there is no principle of law which
would, in my humble opinion, justify the incongruity of dominating or re-
garding the Company itself as enemy either in character or in fact." Lord
PAnxtn, with whom concurred Lords. MsSgY and IaNNArv, took the posi-
tion that enemy character could not be given to the company "merely be-
cause enemy shareholders may after the war become entitled to their
proper share of the profits of trading," but he thought it might assume
enemy character "if its agents or the persons in de facto control of its af-
fairs, whether authorized or not, are resident in an enemy country, or,
wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking instructions from
or acting under control of enemies.' He refused to admit, however, that
the character of individual shareholders could affect the character of the
Company; and on this point Lord PAmooR was in accord.
The problems here suggested are equally relevant to conditions in this
country. Our own TRADING WITH THZ ENmY ACT, so far as corporations
are concerned, does not include companies incorporated in the United States.
However, the illegality of trading with the enemy was recognized at com-
mon law, and the statute does not abrogate or narrow the common law
principles, but only makes special regulations and provides special penalties
for certain classes of acts of this character. The war has brought up a large
number of cases in England involving both the common law and statutory
rules relating to alien enemies, and in the controversies which are sure to
arise here over trading with the enemy, these English cases are likely to
prove of great practical value to American lawyers. E. R. S.
